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Abstract—Users online are commonly tracked using HTTP
cookies when browsing on the web. To protect their privacy,
users tend to use simple tools to block the activity of HTTP
cookies. However, the “block all” design of tools breaks critical
web services or severely limits the online advertising ecosystem.
Therefore, to ease this tension, a more nuanced strategy that
discerns better the intended functionality of the HTTP cookies
users encounter is required.
We present the ﬁrst large-scale study of the use of HTTP
cookies in the wild using network traces containing more than
5.6 billion HTTP requests from real users for a period of two
and a half months. We ﬁrst present a statistical analysis of how
cookies are used. We then analyze the structure of cookies and
observe that; HTTP cookies are signiﬁcantly more sophisticated
than the name=value deﬁned by the standard and assumed by
researchers and developers. Based on our ﬁndings we present an
algorithm that is able to extract the information included in 86%
of the cookies in our dataset with an accuracy of 91.7%.
Finally, we discuss the implications of our ﬁndings and provide
solutions that can be used to improve the most promising privacy
preserving tools.
I. INTRODUCTION
HTTP Cookies (cookies for short) are critical to the function
of the most common and basic web services including; web
mail, social networks, online retail, advertising, etc. They
are also the most widely used method to track the activity
of users online [1] and may be used to transfer personally
identiﬁable information (PII) between a user’s browser and
online services [2].
Recent studies consistently point to the growing disconnect
between users’ desire for privacy and the online services
ecosystem’s desire for more/higher-quality information about
users [3]. In particular 28% of the US citizens admit they
have used the Internet in ways to avoid being observed or
seen by advertisers [4]. In response to users’ desire for better
privacy controls, there is today a burgeoning ecosystem of
tools, services, and business models that aim to help users
to better manage their privacy.1 Consequently the deployment
of anti-tracking tools by users is reported to be growing [5].
In response, we have also witnessed the appearance of more
aggressive techniques to track users browsing patterns that
make use of HTTP Cookies. For example, evercookies [2]
are used to avoid users deleting certain cookies and cookie
1see Adblock Plus, Ghostery, Privacy Badger, Blur, Disconnect and etc.
matching/syncing [6][7][8] is used to aggregate the knowledge
different players have about a user.
Today users can protect their privacy by blocking third
party cookies and/or inserting the (often useless [9]) Do Not
Track (DNT) header, both methods are available in most of the
modern browsers. Users can also deploy third party tools such
as browser plugins and network proxies. These tools (including
NoScript, Adblock Plus, Ghostery, and Disconnect) give users
a sense of security, however, they present serious drawbacks,
such as blocking from 6% to 21% of the functional scripts
deployed in web pages, and allowing the execution of between
37% and 78% of the tracking scripts [23].
First, by virtue of their design, these tools typically break
some of the legitimate functionality of websites. Second,
they cannot protect users from tracking cookies set via ﬁrst
parties [1]. Due to the complex relations that ﬁrst and third-
parties establish [1][5][11], blocking cookies at a domain-
level alone does not protect users [1]. Lastly, it was recently
estimated by PageFair and Adobe [12] that 6% (198M) monthly
active users deployed ad-blocking in Q2 2015, resulting an
estimated loss in revenue of over $21B. Therefore, web services
have started a ﬁght against ad blockers [13], and it is now
common to ﬁnd many popular services that require users to
deactivate the protection tools in order to access content.2
All these well known problems have encouraged the re-
searchers and developers to try to deﬁne ﬁne-grained solutions
to protect the privacy of users with a minimal effect in the
online advertising ecosystem, c.f. [14][15][16][17]. Neverthe-
less, while these proposals are promising, they have been
designed without a comprehensive understanding of the actual
information sent within the cookies. This fact could make them
either to break some of the web-services they intend to ﬁx, or
to provide a false sense of security to their users.
In order to improve existent tools and develop new tools
that can protect the users without side effects a study of the
real use of the cookies is needed.
This paper presents the largest measurement study to date
on the utilization of HTTP cookies in the wild. Using a
dataset composed by more than 5.6B HTTP connections, from
thousands of real users in a European metropolitan network,
2c.f. http://www.wired.com/how-wired-is-going-to-handle-ad-blocking/
we study the utilization, structure and content of HTTP cookies.
First, we look at the schematic structure of cookies and ﬁnd
that they are more complex than what is assumed in both the
academic literature, and by the multitude of tools available to
help protect the privacy of users. We ﬁnd that cookies routinely
obfuscate their contents by using a variety of proprietary
formats. Moreover, because current studies do not look into
the cookies in any great detail, we ﬁnd that they make naive
assumptions regarding how cookies are structured and utilized.
In turn these assumptions lead to a gross over simpliﬁcation of
the complexity of cookies, which results in users having a false
sense of security. Our ﬁndings reveal that at least 60% of the
cookies we ﬁnd in the wild contain complex information that
cannot be interpreted in simple ways. Inspecting the contents
of cookies, we develop a novel method to extract ﬁne-grain
information from the data carried in these complex cookies.
Last, we apply these methods to the cookies in our dataset and
provide analysis of their contents.
Contributions
• We analyze cookies sent by thousands of real users,
in contrast to the vast majority of previous studies
that based their results on traces generated using active
measurements[1][3][15][18][19][20]. The results of our analy-
sis show that the cookie name and value ﬁelds are routinely
packed with multiple values, which can change frequently.
This makes it difﬁcult for ﬁne-grain tools [14][16] to correctly
interpret the behavior of cookies.
• We evaluate some of the common assumptions regarding
the identiﬁability of tracking cookies, ﬁnding some of them
to be wrong. Common assumptions, such as “they are long
lasting”, “have high entropy” and are “constant and unique
for every user” [15][20] are found not to hold in a multitude
of cases. This in turn breaks the basic assumptions made by
state-of-the-art methods such as [14][15] on the identiﬁability
of ‘user identiﬁers’.
• We develop a method to unpack and parse the contents of
cookies with high accuracy. Our simple and scalable method is
able to parse 86.2% of the cookies with an accuracy of 91.7%.
The formats identiﬁed reveal cookies sending PII in clear text
or hiding the user identiﬁers in complex data structures. The
structures obtained with our method could be used directly to
improve the results of some previous works.
II. BACKGROUND
Our analysis is based on passive measurements collected
from a 10Gbps link (Endace DAG 9.2X2 capture card), serving
several thousand users, across several academic institutions,
at a Large European metropolitan region. We collect from
the TCP/IP headers the (src/dst IP, src port, seqn), and
only the HTTP request headers, on port 80. We analyze in
total approximately twelve weeks of trafﬁc (19/01-9/04 2015)
containing more than 40Tb of network traces. We generate
3.8Tb of metadata, comprising of 135K IP addresses, that make
1.6 billions TCP connections to 3.5M different hosts, and send
5.6 billion HTTP requests.
A. Ethic Considerations
The data collection and experiments presented in this paper
have been conducted in the context of the EU-H2020 project
TYPES. UC3M and NEC have obtained the approval for the
research activity conducted in the context of such project from
its IRB committee and Data Protection Ofﬁcer3, respectively.
Moreover, UC3M obtained the consent of the Network Operator
to collect the data and use it for research purposes.
To the best of the authors knowledge, the data collection,
storage and processing conducted followed the European as
well as Spanish and German Data Protection regulation. In
particular, we collect exclusively HTTP request and only
analyze the protocol header. Once the metadata is obtained the
raw data is deleted and only the metadata is stored outside
the measurement server. In the data processing the source IP
address is anonymized using one-way hash functions.
B. HTTP Cookies
HTTP cookies are the standard mechanism used to track
state in the browser of users as deﬁned by among others
the IETF RFC6265 [21]. Brieﬂy, a cookie is deﬁned by the
tuple; {Name=Value; [expires=Expiration_Date;] [path=Path;]
[domain=Domain_Name;] [secure]}. To set a cookie, a host either
adds the Set-Cookie header in HTTP reply messages to user
requests [21], or writes an entry via JavaScript. Once a cookie is
stored at a user’s browser, if not explicitly blocked, the browser
adds the cookie’s Name=Value tuple, to the header of each
HTTP request to assets from hosts from the domain deﬁned
in Domain_Name and in Path, until the Expiration_Date. To
isolate resources between domains, the same-origin policy is
used. It states that domains may only set, read, and modify
cookies which match their Domain_Name, and resource Path.
1) First and third party cookies: When a user visits some
web page W1, W1 can in turn initiate connections to different
domains W2...Wn (i.e., to download images from a CDN, ads
from an ad-network, etc.). We refer to the cookies set by the
domain the user intend to visit (W1) as ﬁrst party cookies
and any of the cookies set by W2...Wn as third party cookies.
Moreover, third party cookies can be used for operational
purposes and some Internet services break if they are blocked.
In contrast, they can also track users online.
The same cookie can act as both third party cookies (i.e.,
Facebook cookies when you see a widget in other website)
and ﬁrst party cookies (i.e., the same Facebook cookies when
you visit facebook.com). Therefore in this work, we do not
differentiate between ﬁrst and third party cookies. Nevertheless,
the common way to track users with cookies needs them to
act as third party cookie.
C. Cookie based tracking
The most simplistic scenario for cookie based tracking occurs
when a user U1 visits web page W1, the browser can make
3Note that L. Jiang and H. Metwalley contribution to this work was developed
while they had a contractual relationship with NEC Labs Europe and thus the
approval from NEC Data protection Ofﬁcer was valid for them.



useless the data for any future analysis. Then, the only way
to correctly process the information is by understanding the
format used to store different values and handle every piece
of information independently.
IV. ENTITY BASED COOKIE INTERPRETER
Having observed that cookies may convey non trivial
information (in their name and value ﬁelds), and that this
information may be encoded in a complex manner, in this
section we propose a method to unpack the contents of cookies
in an unsupervised manner. The primary challenge to be able to
correctly parse the contents of cookies is that while the standard
dictates the need for a name=value tuple be speciﬁed, it
does not place any structure or limitation on the contents of
either. In turn, cookie origins are able to deﬁne arbitrarily
complex schemas to encode values and as shown in the
previous section, pack the value ﬁeld with many variables.
As an example, consider the following individual cookie value:
’’253024271.1453122666.239.16.utmcsr=host.com/sea/|
utmccn=(10.0.0.5)|utmcmd=org|utmctr=ail@host.com}’’
First, the cookie contains several different types of ﬁelds,
speciﬁcally, a Unix timestamp (‘1453122666’), an email
address (‘ail@host.com’) and an IP address (‘10.0.0.5’). Second,
we observe several delimiters (‘.’ and ‘|’) that are combined to
form the text. Third, delimiters may be a part of the content
of ﬁelds without any special demarcation, e.g., in the example
above, the character ‘.’ is both a delimiter and content, i.e.,
within the IP address.
To automatically interpret such cookies, we develop an un-
supervised entity-recognition method that unpacks the contents
of the cookies. Our method is able to extract the individual
ﬁelds in cookie values and interpret the common patterns for
cookie values for different cookie names from each domain.
A. Entity deﬁnition
Similar to the concept of named entity in natural language
processing[22], we deﬁne an entity in this study as a single,
indivisible piece of information in the value of a cookie.
Examples of entities are IP addresses or timestamps. Because
the cookie developers are free to deﬁne any arbitrary ﬁeld,
instead of attempting to identify an arbitrary list of possible
ﬁelds, we have adopted a pragmatic approach and analyzed
more than 100K randomly selected cookies to identify the
most common entity types. Table II lists the most common
entity types (i.e., numeric values, alphanumeric text, boolean,
hexadecimal, json, timestamp, email, url, and ip address).
To accurately identify entities within cookie values, based
on the characteristics and compositions of different types of
entities, we distinguish between singular entities and composite
entities.
Singular entity: Singular entities refer to those ones that
cannot contain a different entity inside. It includes numeric
values, timestamp, alphaNumeric text, boolean, hexadecimal.
Composite entity: Composite entities aggregate numerous
singular entities in an arbitrary order. It includes json, email,
Entity type Example Symbol
Si
ng
ul
ar
Numeric 17 N
AlphaNumeric NewYork A
Boolean True or False B
Hexadecimal 234AD2A5 H
Timestamp 142800298 TS
C
om
po
si
te JSON a:b, c:d... J
Email abc@domain.com E
URL webofknowledge.com/ U
IP 201.202.1.3 I
TABLE II: Entity types and samples
url, and ip address. Clearly, the composite entity may contain
singular entities or other composite entities as part of its content.
In the previous section about 40% of the cookies have been
identiﬁed to be formed by a single composite or singular entity.
Moreover, the remaining 60% of the cookies may be formed
of more than one entity using a proprietary format. In order to
avoid losing of information we have to extract different pieces
of information in the correct order (e.g., if we interpret an
IP address as 4 numbers separated by dots, then, we lose the
chance of checking whether that 4 numbers in fact form an IP
address or not).
B. Entity extraction priority
Composite entities may contain singular and/or composite
entities. For instance, an email may be part of a url (e.g.,
https://domain.com?userEmail=myemail@mydomain.com).
Based on this fact, we deﬁne an extraction order.
First, the JSON objects should be extracted because it can
contain any of the other data types. Next, we extract the other
composite data types, both IP addresses and email addresses
may be included in an URL, thus, we will ﬁrst identify the
URLs, following we will extract the email and IP addresses.
Finally, the simple entities will be extracted. In this case we
have to start for the more speciﬁc entities like the timestamp
and the boolean that could be also identiﬁed as numeric and
alphanumeric, respectively. Following, the hexadecimal values
will be extracted to end up with the numeric and the most
general alphanumeric ones.
C. Cookie interpretation and representation
After the entity extraction, we represent each cookie value
using an entity type as presented in the following example.
Here, “N” denotes numeric value, “TS” denotes timestamp, “A”
denotes alphanumeric text, and “U” denotes URL. This kind
of entity-type representation enables us to interpret cookies in
a ﬁne-grain way and can be used for post-processing.
Input:
’’250607554.1422361545.2.2.utmcsr=host.com|
utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|
utmcct=thesection’’
Output: N.TS.N.N.A=U|A=(A)|A=A|A=A
Format selection: After all the values associated with
a cookie have been interpreted we obtain a set of value
representations. Those value representations may be different
for different values of the same cookie if the format used by
the hosts changes. Thus, it may happen that the selection of
Algorithm 1 Entity-based cookie interpreter
1: Input: Set_type, Set_cookies; β; count=0
 decoding
2: for cookie in Set_cookies do
3: while count++ <= β do
4: check IsEncoded(cookie)  Base64 or URL
5: if True then
6: cookie = decode(cookie)
7: end if
8: end while
 entity extraction
9: for E in Set_type do
10: markup all entities typed with E in cookie (Section
IV-A)
11: extract entities by extraction priority (Section IV-B)
12: end for
13: end for
 format selection
14: Cookie format generation by following Section IV-C
the format used by a cookie is not straightforward. In this case
we deﬁne a threshold α for the minimum percentage of values
that should have the same format to deﬁne it as the general
cookie format. We tuned different values ﬁnding α = 90 as
the optimum trade-off between accuracy and recall.
Moreover, some of the ﬁelds are speciﬁc cases of others.
For example, a numeric value can be sometimes classiﬁed
as a timestamp or an alphanumeric value could be extracted
as hexadecimal. To avoid those cases, we use also a priority
selection in which the most speciﬁc entity (i.e., timestamp)
is selected if it is in at least α% of the cases, if not, it is
interpreted as a more general entity (i.e., number).
With this method we have evaluated the format used by
more than 5M different cookies.
Results analysis: Contrary to the ﬁgures in Table I, only
5.7% of the composite cookies include hexadecimal values
while 69.2% of them include numeric values and more than 22%
include text. Moreover, 35% of the cookies pack a timestamp
together with other values. Thus, one third of the cookies
may include unique identiﬁers even when their values change
continuously. Finally, more than 600 cookies pack the email
of the user inside the cookie value and 8300 cookies includes
an IP address, also considered as private information by the
American and European data protection laws.
D. Algorithm of entity extraction
Algorithm 1 summarizes the whole process of entity-based
interpreter, where Set_type is the entity type list as shown in
Table II. Set_cookies contains all cookies to be processed for
entity extraction. β denotes threshold for iterative decoding.
E. Validating the selected format
The entity based cookie interpreter described above allows
us to identify the format for more than 5M cookies, that is,
the 86.3% of all the cookies that have been sent more than 10
times5 in our dataset. However, the total absence of a ground
truth limits our possibilities to validate the obtained results.
To overcome this problem we have proceeded to do manual
validation. To this end, we have randomly selected 1000 of the
cookies whose formats is to be identiﬁed and we have asked 5
independent persons to manually check if the format assigned
ﬁts with the one of the cookie values. It is important to remark
that in some cases it is difﬁcult, even for human beings, to
identify the underlying format (e.g., some annotators were too
confused to differentiate a URL from pieces of text using the
slash “/” as delimiter or even identifying if a string is a JSON
or not). Thus, we gave our independent annotators 3 different
options. They could select whether the cookie values ﬁt the
format, do not ﬁt it or if the annotator is not sure. Then, we
select as the correct answer that one agreed for more than 50%
of the annotators sure of their answer. In case of a tie, we
select the most conservative option. This is, if 2 annotators
vote the format is wrong, other 2 vote that it is correct and
the ﬁfth one is not sure, we mark it as wrong. Nevertheless,
these cases are residual since the 5 annotators gave the same
answer in 66.6% of the cases.
The results indicate our interpreter identiﬁes the correct
format for 91.7% of the cookies. We consider this accuracy
very high for the ﬁrst implementation of the entity based cookie
interpreter. A manual inspection indicates that our system fails
to interpret three types of cookies: cookies that use more than
one format depending on the user/moment and cookies that
grow, adding more information and changing the format with
the time. In both cases, a manual inspection of the cookie
values is needed to correctly infer the format; 3) the third type
of incorrectly interpreted cookies are in binary format encoded
using Base64 (or other encoders). It is impossible to entangle
the information stored inside them if they are only set and
read by the server. Moreover, if they are set using JavaScript,
only a case by case reverse engineering of the JavaScript code
could shed some light over the format they use.
V. RELATED WORK
The research community has studied online advertisement
and its privacy issues. These studies have been mainly active
measurements, using simulated trafﬁc, with mostly the Alexa
top-K sites [1][18][3][19][20][15]. Furthermore, Ikran et al.
[23] follow a different approach and use machine learning
to identify the javascript snippets used to track users online.
Only the paper from Metwalley et al. [5] presents a passive
measurement study related to advertisement. In [5], authors
ﬁnd that the top 5 trackers contacted more than 90% of the
users.
Related to the study of cookies, works such as [20][15][2]
study how cookies are used as identiﬁers by trackers. In order to
protect users from this phenomenon, Papaodyssefs et al. [16]
propose a proxy that maps public users cookies to private,
always keeping the anonymity of the user. The problem is that
5If a cookie has appeared less than 10 times we cannot infer any format
inside it.
they treat cookies as a whole string, when we have shown that
cookies zip several values on them. Another work [17] protects
users by blocking identiﬁable information from HTTP requests.
But, according to our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst work that
extract information from HTTP cookies characterizing them.
Englehardt et al. [20] ﬁnd that it is possible to reconstruct
up to 73% of user’s history using their cookies alone. Li et
al. [15] ﬁnd that 46% of webpages in the Alexa top 10K
have a third party tracker, and 30% use at least one of the
top 5 ranked trackers. Roesner et al. [1] ﬁnd similar rates
of tracking of users, but show also that ﬁrst and third party
domains commonly bypass the same-origin policy protections
in order to track users. Moreover, [24] study the information
exposed when a user cookie jar is cracked.
Recent studies [1][18][5] show that users online are tracked
continuously. As well as cookies, methods include HTML5
Local Storage, Etags, Flash and Finger-printing [2][25][26].
First and third-party domains collect data on users and exchange
information through a complex of web relations [3][1][19].
All with the aim of proﬁling the complete online activity of
users [18][27], typically for targeted services.
VI. DISCUSSION
The insights obtained from the analysis of the data report two
main implications for the users. First, cookies (not surprisingly)
are still used to transfer PII (Personally Identiﬁable Information)
of the users. Second, the tools available today to protect the
online privacy of user need to be greatly improved to address
the complexity of modern cookies.
The existence of cookies sending PII in clear text represents
a serious leakage on the users privacy. For example, any agent
with access to the network data (i.e., a malicious user snifﬁng
trafﬁc in a public WiFi network) could easily identify the real
user behind the connection if the user’s email or other sensitive
information is sent inside a cookie.
However, online advertisement represents one of the main
source of revenue for webpages and the privacy preserving tools
available nowadays (i.e., Ghostery, AdBlockPlus, NoScript,
etc.) are designed to block the ads. Consequently, they severely
damage the freemium Internet ecosystem. Furthermore, they
also affect the user experience by breaking some legitimate
services. Finally, publishers have started an arms-race against
the ad-blockers that may end up with the users adding
exceptions, thus, removing all the protection against privacy
leakages.
A. Integration of our solution in existent tools
The research community is moving to design and develop
new ﬁne-grained privacy protection tools that allow the online
advertising while still avoiding the privacy leaks[16][17].
Nevertheless, these methods make simplistic assumptions about
the composition of the cookies that could be easily ﬁxed by
using the results of this work.
In particular, the methodology to detect unique identiﬁers in
cookies of our previous paper [14] can be easily extended to
Entity type Anonymization Action
Si
ng
ul
ar
Numeric Hash(number)
AlphaNumeric Hash(text)
Boolean Keep value
Hexadecimal Hash(value)
Timestamp value + random noise
C
om
po
si
te JSON Analyze each variable separately
Email Hash(user)@domain.com
URL host/Hash(path)
IP Mask(IP address)
TABLE III: Anonymization actions
include the format of the cookie value, comparing individual
pieces of information instead of the whole text.
Moreover, solutions like WIT [16] (a network proxy that
translates the user cookies into private ones avoiding the
tracking) would fail to detect the tracking with its actual model.
However, as in [14], the knowledge of the format used inside
the cookie value would help the tool perform more accurately.
Furthermore, WIT also needs to know when cookies include
the user identiﬁers in the cookie name as demonstrated in
section III-B.
The Cliqz browser [17] already blocks all the third party
cookies protecting the user privacy. Nevertheless, as the authors
admit it causes some services to break. They could use the
methodology described in this paper to analyze the format of
third party cookies and block only those parts that make the
users unique.
B. Other implications
The detection of cookie syncing has attracted the attention
of the research community in the last years [7][8]. Moreover,
this detection is most times based in detecting the transfer of
the id used in the cookies to third parties. In order to be able
to do this effectively, we need to correctly detect the user IDs.
The cookie structures detected in this paper can be used as a
pivotal and fundamental step towards that end.
Finally, the output of the cookie interpreter can also be
used to properly anonymize datasets containing cookie data
in a meaningful way. A naive approach would hash the entire
cookie value in order to anonymize it. However, it would make
impossible any further analysis of the information inside the
cookies (i.e., to ﬁnd user identiﬁers). We propose to anonymize
each piece of information inside a cookie independently (using
the structure identiﬁed by the interpreter). That way, we propose
to apply different anonymization operations depending on the
type of each piece of information as shown in table III. It
would keep the privacy of the users, and at the same time, it
would allow further analysis of the data.
C. Available datasets
In order to help developers and the research community to
use the results of this paper we make public two datasets. One
containing a list of domains that use to include information
inside the cookie name and a list with the structure found for
more than 5M different cookies.
The ﬁrst dataset provided can be
found in https://privacyaware.nlehd.de/data/
NumCookiesPerHost_More_1K.csv and includes the
name of all the hosts that use more than one thousand different
cookie names as described in Section III-B (the tail of Fig.
3). The hosts in the list most probably include some kind of
information inside the cookie name. This form of cookie name
tailoring may affect some of the state-of-the-art solutions for
protecting the privacy of the user by intercepting the cookies.
These tools can treat differently the information coming from
the host in the list and researchers can use it as a starting
point to better understand this practice.
Moreover, in https://privacyaware.nlehd.de/data/
patternListComplete.csv we make available a dataset
containing the list with more than ﬁve million cookie value
structures discovered using the cookie interpreter described in
Section IV. This dataset can be used to process each piece
of information inside a cookie separately. It will improve the
accuracy of the methods devoted to identify unique identiﬁers
but also those ones that try to identify cookie syncing. Finally,
it can be used to correctly anonymize other datasets including
cookie data in a meaningful but private manner.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper is the ﬁrst study that analyzes how the cookies
are used in the wild in a ﬁne-grain way on a large dataset
(more than 40Tb network data) coming from real users.
We discovered the structure of the cookies is much more
complex than it has been assumed by previous works that
following the standard deﬁnes a cookie as a pair composed by
a name and a value. We ﬁnd thousands of websites that tailor
the cookie name to include a unique identiﬁer of the user. It
makes difﬁcult to compare cookies among users, moreover, it
affects our ability to generate black lists of cookies to block
only those ones that represent a risk for the user privacy without
breaking any of the Internet services.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd almost 60% of the cookies do not use
a simple format for its value. Instead, they pack multiple inde-
pendent values inside a single cookie using proprietary formats.
It makes impossible to correctly analyze the information inside
without knowing the format used. Thus, we have developed
a methodology that iteratively extract the different pieces of
information inside the cookie values. Our methodology is able
to infer the format with a precision of 91.7% and a recall of
almost 80%.
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